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Constitutional Law-
THE GWINN AMENDMENT:
PRACTICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL
PROBLEMS IN ITS ENFORCEMENT
In passing the Independent Offices Appropriations Act of 1953, Con-
gress attached a rider proposed by Congressman Gwinn, providing that:
"No housing unit constructed under the Housing Act of 1937, as amendedi
shall be occupied by a person who is a member of an organization desig-
nated as subversive by the Attorney General: Provided further, That the
foregoing prohibition shall be enforced by the local housing authority .... -2
To comply with this mandate, local housing authorities passed resolutions 3
requesting each tenant or applicant for future tenancy to sign a certificate
denying present membership in every organization on the Attorney Gen-
eral's list of subversive organizations 4 In a number of instances, tenants
have refused to comply. As a result, the housing authorities have instituted
eviction proceedings 5 or the tenants have sought relief through declaratory
judgments 6 or through injunctions 7 to prevent enforcement of the act.8
1. Peters v. New York City Housing Authority, 307 N.Y. 519, 121 .'.E.2d 529
(1954), required a new hearing on the scope of the amendment. On May 10, 1955, the
official referee held that the amendment applied to all "low-rent" federal housing proj-
ects administered by the Public Housing Administrator. See Weixel v. New York
City Housing Authority, 208 Misc. 246, 143 N.Y.S2d 589 (Sup. Ct. 1955). There is
strong evidence, however, that Congress intended to include coverage of all federally
financed housing projects. See 98 CONG. Ric. 8908-09 (1952).
2. 66 STAT. 403, 42 U.S.C. § 1411c (1952).
3. See, e.g., resolution quoted in Peters v. New York City Housing Authority,
128 N.Y.S.2d 224, 230-31 (Sup. Ct. 1953).
4. The list was issued pursuant to Exec. Order No. 9835, 3 C.F.R. c. 2, at 129
(Supp. 1947), and Exec. Order No. 10450, 3 C.F.R. c. 2, at 72 (Supp. 1953), to im-
plement the Federal Government's employee loyalty program.
5. Rudder v. United States, 226 F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir. 1955) ; Housing Authority v.
Cordova, 130 Cal. App. 2d 883, 279 P.2d 215 (1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 969 (1956);
Chicago Housing Authority v. Blackman, 4 Ill. 2d 319, 122 N.E.2d 522 (1954).
6. Lawson v. Housing Authority, 270 Wis. 269, 70 N.W.2d 605, cert. denied, 350
U.S. 882 (1955); Weixel v. New York City Housing Authority, 208 Misc. 246, 143
N.Y.S.2d 589 (Sup. Ct. 1955) '(injunction and declaratory judgment).
7. Kutcher v. Housing Authority, 20 N.J. 181, 119 A.2d 1 (1955); Peters v. New
York City Housing Authority, 307 N.Y. 519, 121 N.E.2d 529 (1954); Weixel v. New
York City Housing Authority, supra note 6.
8. Applicants who have refused to sign presumably also have been excluded from
occupancy, but apparently none have sought to contest their denial in the courts. Per-
haps, counsel has advised applicants that the right to occupy government housing is
a "privilege" and that an applicant for such a "privilege" need not be afforded due
process. There is recent authority, however, which tends to show that the "privilege"
concept is disappearing from the law. See, e.g., Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183
(1952); Parker v. Lester, 227 F.2d 708 (9th Cir. 1955), 104 U. PA. L. Rav. 703
(1956).
The administrative and constitutional problems raised by the applicant will not be
analyzed exhaustively in this Comment. See notes 18 and 29 infra.
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Enforcement of the Gwinn Amendment in judicial proceedings raises nu-
merous legal problems, both practical and constitutional, as a result of the
courts' initial determination that public housing authorities, in contrast
with private landlords, cannot arbitrarily evict tenants, in spite of sufficient
notice of termination of the lease.9
One of the most troublesome problems created by the Gwinn Amend-
ment is to find a practicable method of administration. Public housing au-
thorities have been given a congressional mandate not to allow subversives
to occupy housing under their control, but Congress has provided no guide
to aid in implementation. One solution seems to have been adopted by all
the authorities: the requirement that all tenants and applicants sign certifi-
cates affirming that they do not belong to the class ineligible to rent. This
procedure has provided an administratively practical method of initially
screening the large number of persons seeking government housing.
As a result of this initial screening, housing authorities have been
faced with a certain number of tenants who have refused to sign. The au-
thority must then determine whether to seek to evict the non-complying
tenants immediately, or to attempt to secure other evidence which would
tend to prove or disprove the tenant's alleged membership. The authority's
course of action ultimately will be determined by whether or not the courts
will accept evidence of refusal to sign as sufficient to satisfy the authority's
burden of persuasion.' 0 Since refusal to sign does not rationally prove
membership, if the courts held this sufficient proof to establish membership
they will have afforded this evidence the status of a presumption.1 The
effect would be to shift the burden of going forward with the evidence to
the defendant.
Whether or not a presumption is justified in this situation depends
upon an analysis of three factors: the probability of the inference to be
drawn, the procedural convenience involved and the relative ease or diffi-
culty of proving or disproving the crucial fact of membership as behveen
the authority and the tenant1 2 Certainly, membership is at least one rea-
sonable inference which can be drawn from refusal to sign, but this infer-
9. E.g., Rudder v. United States, 226 F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir. 1955) ; Housing Author-
ity v. Cordova, 130 Cal. App. 2d 883, 279 P.2d 215 (1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 969
(1956) ; see 55 COLUM. L. REV. 1222 (1955). But cf. Columbus Metropolitan Housing
Authority v. Simpson, 85 Ohio App. 73, 85 N.E.2d 560 (1949).
10. Two courts have held that a showing of refusal to sign would be in itself
insufficient to prove membership in any listed organization. Rudder v. United States,
226 F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir. 1955); Kutcher v. Newark Housing Authority, 20 N.J. 181,
119 A.2d 1 (1955).
11. From the proven fact of refusal to sign an oath denying membership is as-
sumed the fact of membership. For a discussion of the difference between a presump-
tion and an inference see Levin, Pennsylvania and the Uniform Rules of Evidence:
Presumptions and Dead Man; Statutes, 103 U. PA. L. Rxv. 1, 11 (1954) ; Morgan, Pre-
sumptions: Their Nature, Purpose and Reason in 2 BRANDIES LAWYvRs' SocMTY, AD-
DRESSES 3-4 (1949); Um-oiu RutmFs oF EVIDENCE Rule 13.
12. See McCoRmIcK, EvmxNca § 309 (1954). McCormick does not state that all
three of these factors must be present before the presumption is justified. It would
seem that all that should be required to justify a presumption is that the factors which
support it outweigh those factors which weigh against its creation.
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ence is probably not so compelling that, standing alone, it justifies the
presumption. As has been pointed out in the controversy over the privilege
against self incrimination, there are other reasonable inferences which can
follow.13
As a matter of procedural convenience, as has already been pointed
out, the use of the affidavit is a rapid and inexpensive method of initially
processing a vast number of tenants and applicants. However, this initial
convenience alone does not justify the authority in not seeking other com-
petent evidence to support its case. Since the number of non-signers wil
not be great,14 the requirement that an individual investigation be made, at
least superficially, appears to be a reasonable burden. The authority may
be able to hire private investigators or to make use of the files or agents
of appropriate state and federal agencies to attempt to secure additional
evidence. However, there is a possibility that the authority may not be
able to secure funds to hire private investigators, 15 or, even if funds for
this purpose can be raised through increased rentals,16 the authority may
feel that to so act would subvert the avowed purpose of the federal program
-to provide low-cost federal housing for low-income families. Moreover,
governmental investigative agencies may be reluctant to cooperate with the
authorities, either because they feel that their manpower can be put to bet-
ter use in a more crucial area or because they feel that there is a danger,
in allowing the authorities to use their files, that important confidential in-
formants may be revealed in relatively unimportant proceedings.
17
But even assuming that the authority has no adequate means for secur-
ing an investigation, if the innocent tenant normally will be unable to rebut
the presumption of membership, then under no circumstances can the pre-
sumption be justified. This would seem to be the case if the tenant must
adduce evidence going solely to the issue of non-membership in order to
shift the burden of going forward once again to the administrator, for such
13. See Note, Mandatory Dismissal of Public Personnel and the Privilege Against
Self-Incrimination, 101 U. PA. L. R v. 1190, 1199 (1953). Other possible inferences
are self-righteous indignation, religious or libertarian protest, or uncertainty of asio-
ciation activity creating a fear of perjury. Cf. Noonan, Inferences from the Invoca-
tion of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 41 VA. L. Riv. 311, 321 (1955);
Note, Mandatory Dismissal of Public Personnel and the Privilege Against Self-In-
crimination, 101 U. PA. L. Rxv. 1190, 1199-1200 (1953).
14. Although not an accurate reflection of the number of non-signers, it has been
reported that only 60 out of 1,300,000 tenants have contested eviction based on refusal
to sign the specified affidavit. N.Y. Times, Aug. 10, 1955, p. 24, col. 2.
15. Although many municipal housing authorities have been granted the power to
conduct investigations on any "material" matter, see, e.g., CAL. HnALTH & SAg4Y
CoD ANN. § 34318 (West 1954); N.Y. PuB. HoUsING LAW § 37(1) (x); PA. SrAT.
ANN. tit. 35, § 1550(y) (Purdon 1949), the financing of probes into suspected sub-
versive activities of non-signers may be prevented by adverse municipal governments
which, in some states, control the authority's purse strings. See, e.g., N.Y. PuB. Hous-
INC LAW § 96 .which limits the housing authority to securing administrative expenses
from the appropriate municipality.
16. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 1562 (Purdon Supp. 1954); Wis. STAT.
§66.401(2) (1953).
17. Parker v. Lester, 227 F.2d 708 (9th Cir. 1955), suggests that the Government
may henceforth be unable to keep the source of relevant information from applicants
on the ground that national security requires such conduct. See 104 U. PA. L. Ray.
703 (1956).
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proof would be almost impossible to obtain. If, on the other hand, a more
reasonable approach is taken, i.e., that the tenant can rebut the presumption
by giving an acceptable explanation, other than membership, for his failure
to sign, the presumption seems reasonable. If a tenant has refused to sign
the affidavit because his previously avowed libertarian views or religious
creed prevents him from signing such oaths, proof of his reasons should
not be too difficult to obtain and, if believed, obviously would be sufficient
to rebut the presumption. Perhaps, a few innocent tenants will be unable
to adduce sufficient credible evidence to meet this presumption, but this, no
doubt, would be the rare case. While it is difficult to approve a procedure
which may ensnare the innocent, no matter how few, it would not seem that
it is asking too much of our citizenry that they submit to what they con-
sider an unwise law and seek its repeal in the legislature or attack its con-
stitutionality in the courts.'8
The problem of proof of membership is essentially one of complying
with the statute. A related problem, also requiring statutory construction,
has arisen more frequently in the early cases interpreting the amendment.
It is the resolution of what is meant by the ambiguous phrase "subversive"
appearing in the statute. It never was seriously challenged that the word
should be construed according to the Attorney General's list of subversive
organizations prepared for the Government's loyalty program, but a ques-
tion was presented by the fact that before 1953 the list had six categories,
one of which was expressly labeled subversive. 19 However, limiting the
amendment to that group 20 would have had the anomalous result of not
including communists,21 probably the one group that Congress could be
18. In cases involving applicants for housing rather than tenants, a completely dif-
ferent problem is presented. Here the housing authority is not required to go into
court as a plaintiff in an ejectment suit in order to give effect to its decision. Rather,
the applicant must sue for relief and, therefore, must carry the plaintiff's burden of
proof. Consequently there does not appear to be any need to afford the authority the
benefit of the presumption of the applicant's membership in one of the listed organi-
zations. One situation in which it may be properly invoked, however, would arise where
the only charge is that the authority's action was arbitrary and unreasonable for lack
of a sufficient basis of fact to justify the denial.
19. "The Loyalty Review Board shall currently be furnished . . . the name of
each . . . organization ... which the Attorney General . . . designates as totalitarian,
fascist, communist or subversive, or as having adopted a policy of advocating or ap-
proving the commission of acts of force or violence to deny'others their rights under
the Constitution of the United States, or as seeking to alter the form of government
of the United States by unconstitutional means." Exec. Order No. 9835, 3 C.F.R. c. 2,
at 131 (Supp. 1947). The early lists of the Attorney General classified each organiza-
tion within one of the six types here indicated. 5 C.F.R. § 210.15 (1949). Since April,
1953, all organizations have been listed alphabetically without further classification.
18 FED. REG. 2741 (1953).
20. Two courts have held that "designated as subversive" referred only to the
separate category labeled "subversive" by the Attorney General. Rudder v. United
States, 226 F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir. 1955); Kutcher v. Newark Housing Authority, 20
N.J. 181, 119 A.2d 1 (1955).
21. The Attorney General interpreted Exec. Order No. 9835, 3 C.F.R. c. 2, at 129
(Supp. 1947), to require classification into independent and mutually exclusive cate-
gories, and although recognizing that one organization may have characteristics cor-
responding to more than one category, grouped them by the characteristic deemed
predominant. In the 1948 list, however, three of the six organizations termed "sub-
versive" were also listed in the third and sixth groupings. 5 C.F.R. § 210.15 (1949).
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said to have had clearly in mind.Y At the same time, it is not clear that
Congress intended to bar members of all the organizations on the list.3
The interpretation of the meaning of "subversive" in Lawson v. Housing
Authority24 appears to be the one closest to achieving Congress' intent.
That court defined "subversive" organizations as those which advocate or
seek to overthrow the Government through force or other unconstitutional
means. Housing authorities, therefore, should utilize a list which contains
only those organizations which fall within the Lawson definition, and not
the Attorney General's entire list. However, the authorities may have con-
siderable difficulty following such a standard since the Attorney General no
longer categorizes the listed organizations on that criterion.2 5  Perhaps,
the Attorney General, if requested, might be able to bring up to date an old
list which did place organizations within the Lawson category supplemented
with organizations which fall within its purview.2
Turning from the practical to the constitutional problems which the
Gwinn Amendment has evoked, the first is whether the tenant must be
afforded a trial-type hearing before he can be evicted. The Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia, in Rudder v. United States,2 7 found that
the procedure followed by the housing authority was invalid, among other
reasons, for failing to give the Rudders a hearing before attempting to evict
them. The validity of this requirement is doubtful. Due process require-
ments normally are satisfied if an administrative or judicial hearing is al-
lowed before the governmental action becomes final. 2s Since the housing
authority must institute eviction proceedings in court to enforce its deter-
mination of a tenant's ineligibility, an administrative hearing would seem
unnecessary. The tenant's rights would be adequately safeguarded, first,
because the courts provide a hearing on the merits in which the adminis-
trator would have the risk of non-persuasion, and, second, because the ten-
ant would remain in occupancy pending a final court determination. By
independently evaluating the sufficiency of the administrator's complaint on
22. When advocating the amendment on the floor of Congress, Congressman
Gwinn referred to infiltrating communists and socialists. 98 CONG. Rgc. 2639-40 (1952).
At a later date Senator Maybank referred to communists and "other subversives."
Id. at 8908-09.
23. This view, however, was apparently taken by the official referee in the Peters
hearing, when he held that use of the entire list was "within the mandate of the Gwinn
amendment." This view is quoted and followed with approval in Weixel v. New York
City Housing Authority, 208 Misc. 246, 143 N.Y.S.2d 589 (Sup. Ct. 1955). This posi-
tion receives some support from the fact that the list is often referred to loosely as
the "Attorney General's list of subversive organizations."
24. 70 N.W.2d 605, 612 (Wis.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 882 (1955).
25. See note 19 supra.
26. This would be necessary to prevent the anomalous result referred to in the
text at note 21 supra.
27. 226 F.2d 51, 53 (D.C. Cir. 1955). But see Peters v. New York City Housing
Authority, 283 App. Div. 801, 802, 128 N.Y.S2d 712, 714 (2d Dep't 1954).
28. Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, 339 U.S. 594 (1950); Lichter v. United
States, 334 U.S. 742 (1948); Hagar v. Reclamation District, 111 U.S. 701 (1884);
DAVIs, ADMINISTRATIVn LAW § 75 (1951).
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demurrer, the Rudder court itself destroyed any basis for requiring that the
tenant be given an administrative hearing.P
Other constitutional arguments are available which have a good deal
more merit. It can be argued seriously that the amendment is neither
reasonably related to the purposes of the Housing Act to which it is added
as an amendment 3 0 or to the purpose of protecting the national security in
the United States.3 ' In the absence of such relationship to a legitimate
legislative purpose, the statute would be violative of due process.3 2 Fur-
thermore, the language of the legislation contains no requirement of scienter.
It penalizes any member, not only those members who belong knowing of
the organization's nefarious purposes. Construed to affect equally "inno-
cent" as well as "knowing" members, the statute is again probably contrary
to the requisites of due process.33  Most courts have met this problem,
however, by the oft used maxim of statutory construction that when rea-
sonable alternatives are available, the constitutional interpretation will be
chosen.3 They have implied a requirement of scienter.35  Lastly, the
amendment makes no provision for permitting organizations which fall
within its purview to attack their listing as arbitrary. One court, 36 relying
29. The requirement of an administrative hearing prior to action by the authority
is more plausible when the action concerns an applicant rather than a tenant. The au-
thority is not required to bring an action for ejectment when it denies an application
for housing so that the necessity for a judicial hearing before the order becomes effec-
tive, which obviated the need for an administrative hearing on ejectment of a tenant,
is not found here. The only review open to the applicant is a suit by him against the
authority. Moreover, he would not be enjoying the advantages of public housing in
the possibly protracted interim between the denial of his application and final action by
the court. Indeed, he may even be denied standing to secure judicial review at all on
the ground that public housing is a "privilege." See note 8 supra; 104 U. PA. L. Rtv.
703 (1956). As a result, there is a real need for the authority to hold a hearing before
it denies an application solely on the basis of the refusal to sign the requested certificate.
30. Two cases, Chicago Housing Authority v. Blackman, 4 Ill. 2d 319, 122 N.E.2d
522 (1954), and Housing Authority v. Cordova, 130 Cal. App. 2d 883, 279 P.2d 215
(1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 969 (1956), held that the exclusion or expulsion of sub-
versives from public housing had such little relationship to slum-clearing purposes
as to make enforcement of the Gwinn Amendment by local housing authorities an
ultra vires act. For an apparently valid criticism of these rulings, see Note, 69 HAv.
L. REv. 551, 552 (1956).
31. See discussion in text at pp. 701-02 infra.
32. Cf. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499-500 (1954) ; Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v.
Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 505 (1952).
33. Rudder v. United States, 226 F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir. 1955); Chicago Housing
Authority v. Blackman, 4 Ill. 2d 319, 122 N.E2d 522 (1954) (state loyalty oath re-
quirement for tenants); Kutcher v. Newark Housing Authority, 20 N.J. 181, 119
A.2d 1 (1955); cf. Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
34. American Communications Ass'n, CIO v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 407 (1950);
United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106, 120-21 (1948) ; United States v. Delaware & Hud-
son Co., 213 U.S. 366, 407-08 (1909).
35. Lawson v. Housing Authority, 70 N.W.2d 605, 612 (Wis.), cert. denied, 350
U.S. 882 (1955); cf. Garner v. Board of Public Works, 341 U.S. 716, 723 (1951);
Peters v. New York City Housing Authority, 283 App. Div. 801, 802, 128 N.Y.S.2d
712, 714 (2d Dep't 1954). The courts, in Lawson and Peters, held scienter satisfied
when, prior to signing, the tenant was provided with a list of the designated organi-
zations. Since the Gwinn Amendment focuses solely on present membership, the tenant
or applicant is thus given opportunity to sever his ties with the named organizations
prior to signing the affidavit.
36. Peters v. New York Housing Authority, 128 N.Y.S.2d 224 (Sup. Ct. 1953),
53 COLUm. L. REv. 1166.
700 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 104
on Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath,3 7 held that this
failure to provide the organizations with some means of contesting their
designation violated due process. In response to this decision, the Attorney
General has provided for giving notice and the right to contest their desig-
nation to all listed organization's, 38 apparently satisfying the due process
requirement2 9
The Gwinn Amendment may also be attacked as an unconstitutional
restriction of freedom of speech and assembly. -It might be argued, as some
courts have done,4° that, since the Government could completely withhold
such "bounties" as low-cost public housing from its citizens, it should be
able to refuse to grant them to members of organizations which advocate
the destruction of the source of these "bounties." One difficulty with this
argument is that it ignores the fact that by compelling the individual to
choose between membership in an organization and low-cost public hous-
ing, it indirectly limits his freedom of speech and assembly.
The Supreme Court has determined the constitutional validity of sim-
ilar mandatory choices indirectly restricting first amendment guarantees
and, in each case, has sustained the pertinent statute. For example, in
1947, in United Public Workers, CIO v. Mitchell,41 the Court recognized
that in preventing classified public workers from engaging in political ac-
tivity freedom of expression was restricted, but upheld the constitutionality
of this limitation on the basis that the efficiency of the civil service was in
Congress' sphere. In 1950, with American Communications Ass'n, CIO v.
Douds,42 the Court indicated a sensitivity to the coercive effect on party
membership of a statute which required that union officers sign non-com-
munist affidavits before a union could avail itself of LMRA enforcement
mechanisms. Although Chief Justice Vinson purportedly balanced the im-
portance of preventing an interruption of interstate commerce against the
degree of restriction on free speech,4 3 in holding the act constitutional, he
largely deferred to the congressional determination that this restriction
was reasonably necessary to prevent the interruption of interstate com-
merce. In Gerende v. Board of Supervisors," denial of knowing member-
ship in an organization engaged in an attempt to overthrow the Government
by force or violence was held to be a valid requirement for those seeking a
place on the ballot in a municipal election. In Garner v. Board of Puiblic
37. 341 U.S. 123 (1951).
38. 28 C.F.R. c. 1, pt. 41 (Supp. 1954).
39. Peters v. New York City Housing Authority, 283 App. Div. 801, 128 N.Y.S.2d
712 (2d Dep't 1954) ; see Note, 69 HARv. L. Rev. 551, 557-59 (1956).
40. Rudder v. United States, 105 A.2d 741, 745 (Mun. App. D.C. 1953), rev'd on
other grounds, 226 F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir. 1955); Housing Authority v. Mollie Turner,
No. 342,281, Municipal Court, San Francisco, Cal., cited in Brief for Appellees, p. 29,
Rudder v. United States, 226 F2d 51 (D.C. Cir. 1955); cf. Dworken v. Collopy, 91
N.E.2d 564, 571 (Ohio C.P. 1950) (workmen's compensation).
41. 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
42. 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
43. Id. at 400.
44. 341 U.S. 56 (1951) (per curiam).
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Works,45 the Court bowed to a state legislature in upholding as "reason-
able" a statute requiring state employees to sign affidavits denying mem-
bership in communist organizations and advocacy of forcible overthrow of
the government. Finally, in Adler v. Board of Education,46 the Court held
that only choice, not speech or assembly, was restricted by the requirement
that public school teachers sign an affidavit denying membership in sub-
versive organizations.
If the language employed in Adler were to be followed, then the Gwinn
Amendment clearly would not violate the first amendment, for the choice
between membership and public housing is probably less oppressive than
that between membership and public school teaching. However, a better
interpretation of Adler, in view of the previous cases, is that a restriction
is present, but is justified by the need for loyal teachers, particularly where
pupils are in a formative and impressionable stage, and by the legislative
determination that the means adopted is reasonably calculated to effectuate
this policy. In considering the Gwinn Amendment, the prevention of vio-
lent overthrow of the Government or the success of the low-cost housing
programs are concededly legitimate legislative objectives of great signifi-
cance, and denial of public housing represents a relatively minor restriction
on members of subversive organizations. If a court then must defer to
a congressional determination of the reasonable necessity of this restriction
to secure one of the above-named objectives, there apparently is no basis
for finding the Gwinn Amendment repugnant to the first amendment.
However, deferral to the congressional determination is sensible, if at
all,47 only when Congress has attempted rationally to exercise its preroga-
tive. Here no such effort is evident. Indeed, the fact that the Gwinn
Amendment passed as a rider to an appropriations act and the fact that
there was no congressional hearing and little debate on its advisability
strongly suggest that Congress did not really, consider the reasonableness
of the act as a means of preventing the occurrence of a substantive evil.
Rather, it would seem that the act was designed to withdraw a government
bounty from a highly disfavored group.
Therefore, a court may justifiably, and consistently with past cases,
independently balance the relative efficacy of the Gwinn Amendment to
achieve any legitimate legislative objective with the degree to which such
legislation cuts into the first amendment guarantee of free speech. The
court in Peters v. New York City Housing Authority,4 8 in upholding the
constitutionality of the Gwinn Amendment, stated without further elabora-
tion that it had found evidence of a substantial evil in the formation of "cell"
groups within the housing developments. If the removal of this "evil" is
45. 341 U.S. 716, 720-21 (1951).
46. 342 U.S. 485, 493 (1952).
47. There is at present strong judicial opposition to any such deferral where the
legislation in question in any way restricts free speech. See Dennis v. United States,
341 U.S. 494, 579-80 (1951) (Black, J., dissenting).
48. 283 App. Div. 801, 128 N.Y.S.2d 712 (2d Dep't), rev'd on other grounds, 307
N.Y. 519, 121 N.E.2d 529 (1954).
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in itself a legitimate governmental objective, there can be little question
that the Gwinn Amendment would be an effective means for procuring
that result. But subversives, even when concentrated in large numbers, do
not necessarily constitute a substantial evil. Since there is no indication
that subversives are hampering the success of the 'housing program,49 there
is apparently no justification for the Peters finding unless such concentra-
tion threatens the nation's security. The court in Lawson v. Housing Au-
thority 50 recognized the danger to national security as an evil to be guarded
against, and although willing to give weight to a congressional determina-
tion of need, found that the evidence of subversives in federally financed
housing projects showed no threat to national security, and hence held the
Gwinn Amendment unconstitutional in violation of the first amendment.
The Lawson view seems correct in all respects, but particularly in refusing
to defer to an irresponsible and unexpressed congressional determination
of need.
49. See note 30 supra.
50. 270 Wis. 269, 70 N.W.2d 605, cert. denied, 350 U.S. 882 (1955) ; cf. Danskln
v. San Diego Unified School District, 28 Cal. 2d 536, 171 P.2d 885 (1946) (applicants
for use of public building or property).
